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CHAPTER 51
Microeconomic Interpretation of MATSim for
Benet-Cost Analysis
Benjamin Kickho¨fer and Kai Nagel
This chapter explains how MATSim’s agent-based framework can be interpreted from a micro-
economic perspective and how it can be used for the economic evaluation of transport policies,
e.g., for BCA (Bent-Cost Analysis). The text of this chapter is partly taken from Kickho¨fer (2014,
Section 2.3).
Typically, the process of economic policy evaluation consists of three steps: First, forecasting
changes in the system by modeling users’ reactions to a policy (Section 51.1). Second, assigning
some (potentially monetary) valuation to these changes (Section 51.2). And third, applying an
appropriate aggregation rule (Section 51.3). As will be shown in the next sections, these steps are
neither completely independent nor completely dependent on each other.
51.1 Revisiting MATSim’s Behavioral Simulation
Estimating policy intervention benets relies on a sound descriptive model able to predict indi-
viduals’ related behavioral changes. As explained in Section 1.2, agents in MATSim optimize their
mobility behavior over several iterations by reacting to the behavior of other agents. Even if one as-
sumes homogeneous individual preferences in the behavioral parameters of their utility functions
(see Section 3.4), activity locations and activity patterns of agents typically di er, meaning that
the simulation deals with heterogeneous decision makers. It thus seems reasonable to interpret the
simulation from a discrete choice modeling perspective (see Chapter 49). Another attractive rea-
son to use this interpretation lies in the well-established approaches to estimate user benets and
system welfare changes in discrete choice models.
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As shown by Nagel and Flo¨ttero¨d (2012, also see Chapter 47 and Section 49.1.1), the MATSim
choice model is equivalent to a standard MNL model under the following two conditions: rst,
valid choice sets have been found for all individuals; second, the score of each plan has con-
verged to its expectation value (self-consistent state). An approximation of this can be reached
by switching innovation o  (Section 4.5.3) and forcing scores to convergence (Section 3.3.4, also
see Section 49.1.1). Still, the following methodological issues remain:
1. Choice set incomplete: The maximum number of plans J in each agent’s choice set is
limited by memory constraints; the choice set for decision making is, hence, unlikely to be
complete.
2. Plans correlation from innovation: Plans might be correlated. This is very likely if they are
modied or replaced by best-response re-planning modules (e.g., the route choice module),
since they always have a tendency to generate the same answer. However, random muta-
tions, in general, also tend to result in correlated plans, since the concept of a mutation
implies only a small move away from the parent. This violates the required IIA (Inde-
pendence from Irrelevant Alternatives) property of the choice set necessary for a MNL
model.
3. Plans correlation from plans removal: The current MATSimimplementation has a tendency
to retain similar, i.e., correlated, plans when the number of plans has grown beyond J, because
the current default plans remover deletes the plan with the lowest score, which is also typically
most di erent from other plans. As a result, normally only very similar plans—with very
similar scores—remain in the choice set.
These three issues can lead to biased behavior, which would have consequences for economic
evaluation. Possible solutions for these shortcomings are discussed in Section 49.2, and again, from
a di erent angle, in Section 97.3. For the rest of this chapter, it will be assumed that the above issues
are solved, and that a consistent solution has been found for the system states before and aer the
policy change. However, the following text briey discusses possible impacts of the above issues on
policy appraisal results, to facilitate better understanding.
51.2 Valuing Human Behavior at the Individual Level
Following de Jong et al. (2007), a major advantage of the agent-based approach is a seamless
integration of (i) forecasting behavioral changes as a reaction to changes in the system, and (ii)
the subsequent economic evaluation. In this section, it is shown how estimated agent-specic pref-
erences, which determine behavior, can directly be used for deriving individual VTTSs and how
they need to be modied for running a MATSim simulation to obtain individual utility di erences
resulting from a policy change. The next Section 51.3 will then focus on how these individual
utility changes can be used to derive an indicator of overall welfare change for the considered
population.
51.2.1 The Utility of Time
The MATSim scoring function of plan (= alternative) i consisting of q= 0..N− 1 activities and
trips has been introduced in Chapter 3 in the following form:
U =
∑
q
Uact,q(tdur,q, ...)+
∑
q
Utrav,q(ttrav,q, ...) , (51.1)
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where monetary payments (e.g., tolls) are included in Utrav,q and the index i was dropped for
notational convenience.1
An approximate argument about optimal time allocation can be made as follows: Assume
the constraint T−∑q tdur,q−∑q ttrav,q = 0, i.e., that the time per day is limited by T = 24h, dur-
ing which all trips and activities need to be completed. Let us now also assume that all travel times
are xed; i.e., we ignore the possible optimization from departure time or mode switches and con-
centrate on the activity time allocation problem. Optimizing under this constraint leads to the
Lagrangian
L=
∑
q
Uact,q(tdur,q, ...)+
∑
q
Utrav,q(ttrav,q, ...)+µ · (T−
∑
q
tdur,q−
∑
q
ttrav,q) , (51.2)
where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the time constraint.2
Solving the optimization problem leads to
0 != ∂L
∂tdur,q
= U ′act,q(tdur,q, ...)−µ (∀q) (51.3)
and the time constraint equation from above, where U ′act,q := ∂Uact,q/∂tdur,q. Equation (51.3)
states that, at the optimum and without further constraints, the tdur,q need be selected for all
activities q such that all U ′dur,q(tdur,q, ...) are the same and equal to µ.
Equation (51.2) can also be seen as a linearized version of the indirect utility function; for ex-
ample, reducing travel duration by1tq a ects not only Utrav,q, but will also lead to a utility change
of µ ·1tq from the constraint, which can be interpreted as the linearized utility e ect of spending
that time otherwise.3 In consequence, the marginal utility of time spent traveling reads
∂L
∂ttrav,q
= U ′trav,q(ttrav,q, ...)−µ . (51.4)
µ is the marginal utility of time as a resource—the marginal utility generated by increasing T,
i.e., by making the day longer than 24 hours. The marginal utility of time spent traveling is thus
determined by µ, modied by “any enjoyment or dislike of the travel itself ” (Small, 2012).
To get a handle on the MATSim utility function in Equation (51.1), µ and U ′trav,q need to be
obtained separately: µ in order to calibrate U ′act,q as in Equation (51.3) and U ′trav,q to calibrate the
direct utility of time spent traveling, the o set to the marginal utility of time as a resource. This
will be further discussed in Section 51.2.4.
51.2.2 The Utility of Money
Time allocation theory (DeSerpa, 1971; Jara-Dı´az and Guevara, 2003) makes a similar argument
for money, with a budget constraint similar to the time constraint. Just as the time constraint leads
to a marginal utility of time as a resource, the budget constraint leads to a marginal utility of money
as a resource.
1 Strictly speaking, at this point, it would make more sense to stay with the scores S that MATSim generates.
Section 51.2.5 discusses the relation between MATSim scores S, systematic utility V and total utility U in more detail.
However, since the following text uses terms like “marginal utility of time” or “marginal utility of money”, equations
are also noted using U instead of S.
2 This should not be confused with the scale parameter from discrete choice theory; here, to be consistent with time
allocation theory, µ represents the marginal utility of time as a resource and corresponds to βdur in Chapter 3.
3 A reminder: the indirect utility function describes utility as a function of the value of the constraint that emerges
when, for each value of the constraint, utility is maximized.
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However, MATSim does currently not include such a monetary budget constraint. It is also ques-
tionable whether it should be introduced: the typical theoretical argument assumes the possibility
of increasing one’s income by working more hours. It is questionable if this functions in European
countries, where work contracts typically include a xed number of working hours, which cannot
easily be changed. Hence, an alternative derivation of the marginal utility of money is necessary.
Assume that Utrav,q includes a change in the monetary budget, λ ·1m, e.g., invoked by fares or
tolls. Then
∂U
∂m
= ∂Utrav,q
∂m
= λ, (51.5)
that is, reducing the monetary budget by1m reduces the utility by λ ·1m. We will therefore inter-
pret λ as the marginal utility of money.4 Taking the rst derivative of L with respect to m would
lead to the same result.
In contrast to the marginal utility of time above, we do not break down the marginal utility of
spending money for travel into a marginal utility of money as a resource, and an o set for spending
money on a particular purpose (for an example of this decomposition, see, e.g. Munizaga et al.,
2008). Because there is no monetary budget constraint, there is also no neutral Lagrange multiplier
that would give the marginal utility of money as a resource.
This, however, leads to the problem that if there are multiple monetary channels, they may have
di erent marginal utilities of money. For example, the marginal utility of toll payments is larger
than the marginal utility of payments for fuel—i.e., people nd it less irritating to pay for fuel than
to pay tolls (see, e.g., Vrtic et al., 2008). That is, each monetary channel, such as fuel cost, toll, public
transport fare, or a toll refund, may lead to di erent preference estimates.
To our knowledge, there is no best solution to this problem in the literature. For the time being,
we work with forcing all alternatives’ cost-related parameters to a uniform value in preference es-
timation. However, choice modelers typically avoid limiting the model’s degrees of freedom in this
way, since it suppresses some information contained in the data.5 It is therefore oen impossible
to obtain necessary parameter estimates from the literature. Where raw data is available, the same
model can be re-estimated with a uniform marginal utility of money across alternatives (see, e.g.,
Kickho¨fer et al., 2011; Tirachini et al., 2014).
Also, Small (2012) points out that the “neutral” marginal utility of money as a resource is dicult
to estimate; for example, it is not the marginal utility of income. As an alternative research avenue,
we could hypothesize that a measure’s monetary channels are included in the choice experiment.
For example, a travel time improvement in a value-of-time study could come together with a hy-
pothetical income tax increase, or with a hypothetical toll. A rudimentary version of this actually
takes place in Switzerland, where large infrastructure investments are bundled with tax increases
that pay for them before they are put to public vote (see, e.g., BAV, 2013).
51.2.3 Value of Time
The VTTS of trip q is now dened as the marginal utility of time spent traveling (Equation (51.4)),
divided by the marginal utility of money (Equation (51.5)), i.e.,
VTTSq = ∂L/∂ttrav,q
∂L/∂m
, (51.6)
4 This constant, potentially person-specific, implies that income effects (Herriges and Kling, 1999; Daly et al., 2008;
Dagsvik and Karlstro¨m, 2005; Jara-Dı´az and Videla, 1989) do not play a role, i.e., that changes in expenses resulting
from transport policies are not strong enough to change λ. In microeconomic theory, λ is the usual variable for the
marginal utility of money and corresponds to βm in Chapter 3.
5 J. de Dios Ortu´zar, personal communication.
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where we are using the indirect utility function since we assume that the traveler compares optimal
allocations before and aer the change.
With ∂L/∂ttrav,q = U ′trav,q−µ from Equation (51.2) one obtains
VTTSq =−
U ′trav,q
λ
+ µ
λ
, (51.7)
µ/λ is sometimes called the value of time as a resource.
51.2.4 From Estimated to MATSim Parameters
As stated above, most value of time studies do not separately estimateµ,λ, and U ′trav,q (∀q). Assume
that an MNL estimation of behavioral parameters from a mode choice survey between car and PT
uses the following utility functions:
Ucar,q = βˆtrav,car · tcar,q + βˆm ·1mcar,q
Upt,q = βˆ0 + βˆtrav,pt · tpt,q + βˆm ·1mpt,q , (51.8)
where tcar,q, tpt,q, 1mcar,q and 1mpt,q are, respectively, travel times and monetary costs in the
di erent modes, and βˆx are the corresponding parameter estimates As explained in Section 51.2.2,
βˆm (the same as λ above) is assumed to be the same for all modes, or more precisely, for all types
of expenditure.
According to Equation (51.4), the marginal utility of time spent traveling needs to be split into
two components:
1. The marginal utility of time as resource, which needs to be used for U ′act(tdur,q, ...) (∀q) in
Equation (51.3).
2. The direct marginal utility of time spent traveling, which needs to be used for
U ′trav,q(ttrav,q, ...).
We do not know of any good way to perform this split; Kickho¨fer et al. (2011) and Kickho¨fer
(2014) use the least negative βˆtrav,mode for µ (i.e., βdur) and then re-calculate all other direct
marginal utilities of travel time relative to that. As indicated in Section 3.4 of this book, this is
currently the preferred procedure.
51.2.5 From Simulation Output to Evaluation
At the end of the simulation run, each agent n has a number of plans i= 1..J, each of them as-
sociated with a score Sn,i, computed according to Equation (51.1). For economic evaluation, the
question arises how to aggregate these Sn,i into an agent-value Sn, which can then be interpreted
as a utility Un. Possibilities include using:
• the logsum of the agent’s plans scores, i.e., ln
∑
i eSi
• the score of the agent’s last executed plan,
• the average of the agent’s plans scores, or
• the highest score of the agent’s plans.
51.2.5.1 Using the Logsum of the Agent’s Plans Scores
In literature, the logsum term
logsumn = ln
∑
i
eVi
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has been proposed for applied welfare analysis with Discrete Choice Models (Small and Rosen,
1981; de Jong et al., 2006; Kohli and Daly, 2006; de Jong et al., 2007). Under the assumption of a
correctly specied model and choice set, the logsum term represents the EMU (Expected Max-
imum Utility) for a user with several options i= 1..J in her choice set and the systematic utility
of each option i is Vi. It is the expectation value, given that a random (Gumbel-distributed) εi is
added to each Vi, and that the individual chooses the alternative with the highest Ui = Vi+ εi.6 In
this interpretation, the (expected/average) MATSim score Si is equated with the systematic part of
the utility Vi.
However, as described in the previous Section 51.1, the use of MATSim as choice set generator
yields issues with incompleteness of the choice set and with similarity of daily plans. In the current
MATSim implementation, the maximum error occurs when all plans are copies of the best plan,
rather than a diversity of plans. An upper bound of this error can be approximated as follows.
Without loss of generality, assume that i= 1 is the plan with the largest systematic utility. Then
logsumn = EMUn = ln
J∑
i=1
eVi ≤ ln
J∑
i=1
eV1 = ln(J · eV1)= ln J+ lneV1 = V1+ ln J .
At the same time, obviously
logsumn = EMUn = ln
J∑
i=1
eVi ≥ lneV1 = V1 .
Overall,
V1 ≤ logsumn ≤ V1+ ln J .
That is, for a choice set with I alternatives, the true logsum value lies between the systematic utility
of the best option, V1, and V1+ ln J.
51.2.5.2 Using the Score of the Agent’s Last Executed Plan
Using, for each agent, the logsum over the scores of all plans implies that all these plans are valid
behavioral choices. An alternative would be to simply use the score of the last executed plan. The
behavioral interpretation consistent with this procedure is that there is no additional relevant ran-
domness beyond what MATSim generates intrinsically. There has been no systematic work in this
direction in the MATSim context, but such an approach might be justied in conjunction with
the idea of explicitly generating the missing εn,i for each person-alternative-pair n, i, then always
selecting the best plan, as described in Section 97.4.6.
51.2.5.3 Using the Average of the Agent’s Plans Scores
In principle, it is also possible to use
Sn = 1J
J∑
i=1
Sn,i · Pn,i , (51.9)
where Pn,i is the probability of plan i for agent n. This can, however, only be justied when the
choice probabilities, Pn,i, are interpreted like mixed strategies from game theory, i.e., that sam-
pling from these probabilities is the true agent behavior. In principle, we cannot see why such an
6 At this point, we assume that Vi is absorbing the scale parameter.
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interpretation should be plausible—except that it is statistically the same as Section 51.2.5.2 with
the advantage of having less variance. Note, however, that the approach is intertwined with the
choice model. If, e.g., Pn,i is one for the plan with the highest score and zero for all other plans,
then Section 51.2.5.2 and Equation (51.9) are identical.
51.2.5.4 Using the Highest Score of the Agent’s Plans
Alternatively, one could simply use the highest score that the agent has in its plan. This would only
make sense if true behavior is assumed to always select the plan with the highest score. Again, this
should then also be expressed by the choice model, i.e., using the highest score only makes sense
when the agent always selects the plan with the highest score, in which case the result becomes the
same as Section 51.2.5.2 and 51.2.5.3.
51.2.5.5 More Complicated Variants
Section 49.1.2 discusses the idea that MATSim’s typical choice model might be described by a
mixture-of-logit model. In that model, ni remains xed per agent n and alternative i, but other
attributes such as the network conditions vary from one iteration to the next. In Equation (49.5),
ηni denotes these random, but simulation-generated, deviations from the average conditions; let
us add an index k for the iteration number, i.e., write ηkni. That is, it is postulated that a real person
would know both ni and ηkni, but the simulation only knows the latter (through the MATSim
score). Equation (49.5) then just describes the resulting choice distribution from what MATSim
oen does, i.e., apply a logit model to scores that are not averaged.
At least for ηkni that are uncorrelated from one iteration to the next it is, however, clear that this
will not result in optimal average agent behavior – the agent may be pushed towards some choice by
a random uctuation of the ηkni, but obtaining a much lower score from that choice in the average.
Overall, the agent would be better o  by rst averaging the score of each alternative over many
iterations, and then basing her choice on those scores. This goes back to the converged scores of
Section 49.1.1.
Calculating benets from a mixture-of-logit interpretation becomes thus rather involved: we
postulate that the agent sees the full MATSim score, plus some private s; that she optimizes based
on the sum of these two; that the MATSim simulation, however, does not know the s and thus
has to sample from the logit model; but that the economic utility has to include the e ect of the s
although we do not know them, as in Section 51.2.5.1. Overall, thus, assigning utility values to such
behavior as described by Equation (49.5) requires a better understanding of underlying behavioral
rationality. Section 97.4.6 discusses this further.
51.2.5.6 Summary
Overall, there seem to be two consistent strategies to aggregate various plan scores of an agent n
into one value:
• If the choice model is a logit model, then using the logsum term over all plan scores as the
agent’s utility Ui is consistent with the choice model.
• If the choice model is such that the plan with the highest score is selected, then using that score
as the agent’s utility Ui is consistent with the choice model.
In both cases, the choice model needs to be consistent with the behavioral assumption about the
agent, i.e., in the rst case it needs to be assumed that the model does not know the true agent
choice beyond the choice probabilities and the model system thus has to repeatedly sample from
these probabilities. In the second case it needs to be assumed that the randomness has already been
“frozen” into the score computation (see Section 97.4.6) and the agent thus selects the plan with
the highest score.
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In both cases, the calculated individual score di erences that result from a policy measure can
be directly used in order to identify winners and losers.
Some economists claim that the modeler’s task of providing information for decision support
ends at this point (Ahlheim and Rose, 1989). However, in practice, some (monetary) valuation of
the resulting behavioral changes is oen required. The next section reviews di erent possibilities
to monetize and aggregate individual utility di erences in the MATSim context.
51.3 Aggregating Individual Values
Aer having obtained the individual changes in terms of utility, it is oen necessary to convert
these utility changes into monetary terms for economic evaluation, e.g., in BCA. Unfortunately,
no “correct” monetization or aggregation approach exists for individual utility di erences. This is
reected by the ongoing discussion7 between transport policy appraisal experts:
1. The rst stream argues in favor of a consistency in values used in demand modeling and ap-
praisal (Grant-Muller et al. (2001, p.255), Bickel et al. (2006, p.S4 and p.S8), and Proost8 ).
Values from literature should only be used if behavioral model values are not available. These
researchers are, however, aware that this procedure potentially limits the comparability of
projects in di erent regions of the same state, or in di erent member states of the EU (Euro-
pean Union). In consequence, additional indicators such as absolute time savings per income
group should also be reported to address equity issues.
2. In contrast to the above, Mackie and Worlsley (2013, p.12) state, that in the United King-
dom, “standard [VTTS] values per minute would be used across incomes, modes and regions.
Therefore, their practice is to use behavioral information for modeling but standard values
for appraisal.” Also Daly (2013) distinguishes between “valuation”, i.e., people’s willingness-
to-pay (or accept) for marginal changes, and “appraisal”, i.e., what these changes are worth
from a societal point of view.
3. Fowkes (2010), OECD (2006), and Gu¨hnemann9 argue slightly di erently, but in the same
direction: modeling and evaluation should be based on the best heterogeneous preferences
available; in the evaluation, additional weights should be introduced, e.g., to counter the ef-
fect of decreasing marginal utilities of money, or increasing VTTS with income, respectively.
These weights would, thus, dene the underlying equity concept of the appraisal method.
4. However, as Ahlheim and Rose (1989) point out, no approach to empirically determine these
weights is available without assuming some arbitrary a-priori specication. In consequence,
every interpersonal comparison of utility changes requires some normative decision and the
weights need therefore to be determined on a political level.
One goal of this section 51.3 is to show the impact of a possible integration between behav-
ioral modeling and economic evaluation in the same agent-based framework. First, a conversion
into income equivalents, and second, a conversion into time equivalents (possibly followed by some
conversion into money terms).10 The choice of the procedure depends on a (normative) decision
whether one EUR or one h should be valued equally across individuals. It is, therefore, important
7 A similar overview on this discussion is given by Bo¨rjesson and Eliasson (2014).
8 S. Proost, personal communication.
9 A. Gu¨hnemann, personal communication.
10 Kickho¨fer (2014) shows that the choice of the monetization and aggregation procedure can have major impact on
the results when heterogeneity is assumed in user preferences.
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that decision makers and modelers who deal with economic evaluation understand the possible
e ects of that choice; simply going with the most common approach may not be advisable.
51.3.1 Income Equivalents
Basic Approach The most common approach used in welfare economics to convert utility
changes into money terms is to calculate the monetary amount 1Yn that one would need to give
or take from individual n to o set the impact of the policy on the utility level 1Un. According to
Equation (51.1), it is calculated as
1Yn =−1Un
λn
. (51.10)
Note that the marginal utility of money, λn, might be person-specic, e.g., dependent on the
person’s income.
The monetary amount−1Yn from above represents individual Consumer Surplus. Its absolute
value is, in the absence of income e ects (see Footnote 4 in Section 51.2.1), equal to the Compen-
sating Variation and the Equivalent Variation (Daly et al., 2008). The overall welfare change 1W
for the population with individuals n= 1..N is then calculated by
1W =−
N∑
n=1
1Yn . (51.11)
Equity The above approach is oen criticized for equity reasons: if the marginal utility of money
is—in the behavioral model—assumed to decrease with income, and these values are directly (with-
out additional weights) used in economic evaluation, rich people will have a stronger impact in
the evaluation process than poor people. In turn, this might lead, e.g., to investments in expensive
high-speed trains on major corridors rather than a ordable train services for everyone. In terms
of equity and public acceptance, such specication in the appraisal method might not be desirable.
To counter this e ect in economic evaluation, the use of standard or equity values is proposed in
the literature. In this context, Jara-Dı´az (2007, p.106 ) introduces the social utility of money and
the social price of time. For a more general overview of possible solutions how to address equity
issues, see Rizzi and Steinmetz (2015).
A rather ad-hoc but simple possibility is to replace the person-specic marginal utility of money,
λn, with a population average,
λ := 1
N
∑
n
λn , (51.12)
and then
1Yn =−1Un
λ
. (51.13)
Following the argument by Fowkes (2010), OECD (2006) and Gu¨hnemann et al. (2011) mentioned
above (Item 3), this would be one particular way to introduce the necessary weights. Alternatively,
one could think of xing the social weight of every person to 1.0, and derive the social price of all
attributes included in the generalized costs from there (Jara-Dı´az, 2007, p.108f).
51.3.2 Time Equivalents
Another option to derive a monetary measure of welfare changes is composed of two steps: First, a
conversion of individual utility changes into equivalent hours of time as a resource (Jara-Dı´az et al.,
2008; Mackie et al., 2001). This would be the number of hours1Tn that one would need to give or
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take from individual n to o set the policy impact on the utility level1Un. Second, a monetization
of the resulting numbers through an arbitrary conversion factor, i.e., the monetary value of one
hour for the individual or for society.
In the MATSim sense, one could rst calculate the corresponding time equivalent by
1Tn =−1Un
µn
. (51.14)
Similar to the marginal utility of money, also the marginal utility of time as a resource, µn, might
be person-specic.
One option would be simply provide time equivalents, i.e., the BCA would return time equiva-
lents per invested monetary unit. In many situations, however, it is desirable to convert all impacts
of a policy into monetary terms, i.e., to compute,
1Yn = αn ·1Tn , (51.15)
and to compare1Yn with investment or changes in external costs. The following options are then
possibilities for αn:
• The obtained time equivalents 1Tn could be converted in monetary terms using the person-
specic resource values of time, i.e.,
αn = µn
λn
. (51.16)
This would obviously result in the same monetary amount as the income equivalent approach
from Equation (51.10).
• Following Mackie and Worlsley (2013), one could argue that the resource value of time should
be the same for every individual, and, thus, use some average value for monetization, e.g.,
αn ≡ α = 1N
N∑
n=1
µn
λn
.
• As another alternative, one could average over the marginal utility of money only, i.e.,
λ= 1
N
∑
n
λn
and then
αn = µn
λ
. (51.17)
This would highlight that some persons are more pressed for time than others, while, at the
same time, using an equal value for the marginal utility of money. Clearly, this gives the same
result as Equations (51.12) and (51.13). It does, however, lend itself to a clearer interpretation:
rst, all utility di erences are converted to a comparable scale, i.e., time as a resource (Equation
51.14). Then, these times are converted to a monetary scale, using a conversion factor which
includes the pressure for time (i.e., the person-specic µn) but assumes an average marginal
utility of money.
In all cases, the overall welfare change 1W for the population with individuals n= 1..N is then
calculated identically to Equation (51.11), i.e., by1W =−∑Nn=11Yn.
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51.3.3 Income vs Time Equivalents: Discussion
The sections above show how to monetize and aggregate individual utility di erences though
income equivalents or time equivalents. To summarize:
• Income equivalents put emphasis on the individual willingness-to-pay, whereas time equiva-
lents focus on time pressure.
• The aggregation of income equivalents yields the overall equivalent monetary cash ow that
would be generated by the project for the population considered. That is, one EUR is valued
equally across individuals.
• The aggregation of time equivalents yields the overall equivalent lifetime hours that would be
generated by the project for the population considered. That is, one hour of lifetime is valued
equally across individuals.
• A monetization of time equivalents using person- and activity-specic resource values of time
leads to the same total benet as directly aggregating income equivalents.
• A monetization of time equivalents using some average value of time as a resource, therefore
generally leads to a di erent total benet than directly aggregating income equivalents. Such
an approach maintains the equal value for one h of lifetime.
51.3.4 Conclusion and Recommendations
Scoring Function A correct scoring function is central to correct MATSim functioning. The
mathematics and understanding of that scoring function need to be derived from time allocation
theory in economics. In particular, any marginal utility of travel time needs to be split into the
marginal utility of time as a resource (µ in the text above, and βdur in Section 3.4) and an addi-
tional direct marginal utility of time spent traveling (U ′trav,q in the text above, and βtrav,mode,q in
Section 3.4).
Since most discrete choice models estimate the sum of these two, denition is required about
how to split up this sum. A somewhat ad-hoc way to achieve this is to nd the mode with the
largest (= least negative) marginal utility of time and use that value for the marginal utility of time
as a resource. That reference mode’s direct marginal utility of time spent traveling is then zero; all
other modes’ direct marginal utilities of time spent traveling are relative to that of the reference
mode.
If one is interested in monetization, i.e., converting utility values into monetary terms, then ad-
ditionally the marginal utility of money as a resource (λ in the text above, and βm in Section 3.4)
needs to be known. Our current approach to obtain an approximation to λ is to force all monetary
preferences in the estimation of a choice model to a unique value. If this is not possible, then one
has to make a normative decision which monetary channel is considered most “neutral”, i.e., most
similar to an “unearned income” channel.
Choice Model and Score Aggregation MATSim agents normally have more than one plan; each
plan has a score. There are two consistent approaches to come up with a utility value from those
scores:
• Using a MNL choice model that makes probabilistic draws from those plans using their scores:
The correct aggregation is then the logsum of all scores.
• Using a choice model that selects the plan with the highest score: The correct aggregation is
then to use the score of that plan.
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In both cases, the result is the total utility U of the choice set. In the rst case, the logsum term
includes an expectation value of the randomness, typically denoted by ε. In the second case, all
randomness, if any, needs to be “frozen” into the alternatives, and included into the computation
of the score.
Monetization Individual utility di erences resulting from a change in the transport system can
be converted into monetary terms by dividing them by λn. The result is the change in individual
user benet. Aggregating these individual benets provides an indicator for the overall welfare
change. Since λn may vary among agents, e.g., according to their incomes, such approach will put
a higher weight on people with small λn, typically those with large incomes. An alternative is to use
an average λ for this conversion, even when the behavioral model (= the scoring function) uses
person-specic λn.
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